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The Kaimowitz Case: A Short Term Legal Restraint
Contrary to the Long Term Public Good
Yale David Koskoff, M.D.*
It is commonplace to hear the view expressed that we live in a
rapidly changing world. Therefore, Judge Frank M. Johnson's ob-
servation that:
certainly the founding fathers would be astonished to awaken
in the mid 1970's and to survey the growing list of fundamental
social problems which are each day presented to the Federal
Courts for adjudication'
should not surprise us. One social problem which has recently re-
ceived attention in the courts has been the relationship between
human experimentation and treatment. In 1957, Ladimer noted in
the New England Journal of Medicine:
The conduct of medical practice generally conceived to be diag-
nosis, treatment and care is governed by state statute and sup-
porting administrative licensing and regulatory bodies. There
is no existing broad police power statute for control of human
research although it is by nature subject to general police
power.
Human research. . . warrants (legal) recognition as a separate
endeavor affected with public interest as significant as medical
practice itself.'
In Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health,3 a Michigan court
courageously and somewhat emotionally attempts to draw for the
first time a judicial line between experimental research and accept-
able treatment. It deals not only with current legal issues in psycho-
surgery but with human experimentation in general. The opinion
* Clinical Associate Professor of Neurosurgery, Department of Psychiatry, University of
Pittsburgh Medical School.
1. Johnson, Judge Backs Help for Mentally Ill, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1975, at 11, col. 1.
2. Ladimer, Human Experimentation: Medico-Legal Aspects, 257 NEw ENG. J. MED. 18,
24 (1957).
3. Civil No. 73-19,434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne Co., Mich., July 10, 1973).
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appears destined to influence future judicial and legislative activity,
and to produce future litigation and controversy.' In this connec-
tion, Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo's admonition comes to mind:
"declare the law not only as the past has shaped it . . . but as the
future ought to shape it in cases yet to come." 5
It was historically predictable that the first judicial line between
experimental research and therapy would be drawn in psychosur-
gery; psychosurgery being defined as the surgical removal or de-
struction of brain tissue with the primary intent of altering the
behavior of the patient. From its inception, psychosurgery has been
dogged by controversy, often bitter, acrimonious and destructive;
truth frequently obscured by faulty or incomplete information or
built-in bias about the surgical approach to the modification of
behavior. It was an unfortunate name, both philosophically, and
psychologically and was anatomically untenable. The brain is the
organ of the mind, the place of the mind. Changes in brain alter
mental processes-the way a person perceives himself, his world,
and how he feels about happenings within and without. "But mind
always as we know it is insulated and devoid of direct liason with
other minds."6 It does not involve chemistry and physics as it pro-
ceeds like a ghost in the spatial world. Surgery of the mind, the
psyche, the soul, conjures up the metaphysical, the magical, the
untouchable. The name psychosurgery is threatening.
It was G. Burckhardt,7 Swiss psychiatrist, who was the first to
treat mental disorder by brain surgery. He applied the technique to
severely disturbed schizophrenic patients. Violent patients danger-
ous to their comrades became harmless working patients. Eventu-
ally, as a result of recriminations from his colleagues, Dr. Burck-
hardt was forced from practice.
In 1935, Egas Moniz, Portuguese neurologist, later Nobel Laure-
ate, with the help of his neurosurgical colleague, severed frontal
pathways in twenty patients. Following the report of his results, the
modem era of neurosurgical treatment of psychiatric disorders was
4. Mason, Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health: A Right to be Free from Experi-
mental Psychosurgery?, 54 B.U.L. REV. 301 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Mason].
5. B.N. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS 137 (1931).
6. C. SHERRINGTON, MAN ON His NATURE 198 (rev. ed. 1951).
7. Burckhardt, Ueber Rinderexcisionen, als Beiltrag zur Operativen Therapie der
Psychosen, 47 ALLG. ZISCHR. PSYCHIAT. 463 (1891).
8. E. MONIz, TENTATIVES OPERATOIRES DANs LE TRAiTEMENT DE CERTAINES PSYCHOSES
(1936).
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born. The infant was transported to America. It grew to prodigious,
some say monstrous, size. Its American father was the late Walter
Freeman, neurologist, who, with James Watts, performed the first
frontal lobotomies in this country.' Freeman named the infant
psychosurgery,1° apparently in contradistinction to psychoanalysis
which had reached its zenith in America at about the same time.
Eventually Freeman and Watts parted and Freeman continued with
his own transorbital technique."
Varieties of procedures evolved directed toward reducing undesir-
able side effects and to achieve more specificity in the treatment of
varying disturbances of behavior. One operation (topectomy) 2 was
designed to remove different areas of the frontal lobes depending on
the presenting symptomatology. In other words, the operation was
tailor made for each specific presenting problem. For most neuro-
surgeons, the generally performed technique involved the sectioning
of the medial and orbital pathways of the frontal lobes. Temporal
lobectomies were performed in isolated instances on the theory
that the temporal lobe was the most important association area.
(Obrador) 3 Thalamotomy was carried out by the use of "stereo-
encephalotome,"'I the forerunner of the contemporary stereotaxic
instruments. It appeared to me at least that, in so far as frontal
lobotomy for the relief of suffering was concerned, results appeared
to depend more on the quantity of fibers severed than on the specific
regions involved.' 5
This new treatment method, however, was not without disadvan-
tages. One of the early untoward results of brain surgery for the
relief of psychiatric disorders was the permanent congnitive-
affective loss. Although later surgery markedly reduced the incid-
ence of such loss a new word was introduced. "Lobotomized"-the
state resulting from a neurosurgical approach to the treatment of
9. Freeman & Watts, Prefrontal Lobotomy in Agitated Depression: Report of a Case, 5
MED. ANNALS DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 326 (1936).
10. W. FREEMAN & J.W. WATTS, PSYCHOSURGERY (1940).
11. Freeman, Transorbital Lobotomy: Preliminary Report of Ten Cases, 17 MED. ANNALS
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 257 (1948).
12. SELECTIVE PARTIAL ABLATION OF THE FRONTAL CORTEX: A CORRELATIVE STUDY OF ITS
EFFECTS ON HUMAN PSYCHOTIC SUBJECTS (F.A. Mettler ed. 1949).
13. Obrador, Temporal Lobotomy, 6 J.NEUROPATH. & EXPER. NEUROL. 185 (1947).
14. Spiegel, Wycis, Fried & Lee, Stereo-encephalotomy, 69 PROC. Soc. EXPER. BIOL. &
MED. 175 (1948).
15. Koskoff, Dennis, Lazovik & Wheeler, The Psychological Effects of Frontal Lobotomy
for the Alleviation of Pain in the Frontal Lobes, 27 A.R.N.M.D. 723 (1947).
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suffering-was permanently branded in our language as synonym-
ous with "zombie." The good that the procedure had done in reliev-
ing the suffering of the tormented mentally ill in the back wards of
our mental hospitals, and of those wracked by the pain of cancer was
"interred" while the "evil" lived after.
Controversies arose during this era of psychosurgery. For the most
part, the general public was not involved, nor were politicians and
the courts. It was mainly an interprofessional conflict. Many psychi-
atrists, with their holistic views, were unwilling to accept the neuro-
surgeons direct attack on the brain as a valid treatment of mental
disorder. Those who sought neurosurgical honors were admonished
to read Karl Menninger's remarks on "polysurgical castration de-
vices, not those of strictly phallic significance but those that maim
and destroy the creative function of a non-mutilated body.'
6
Brain surgical procedures for the mentally ill gradually became
more and more infrequent. After 1952, the advent of the tranqui-
lizer, the energizers, and other psychopharmacological agents
hastened the demise of psychosurgery, as applicable in the treat-
ment of mental disorder. The view of the distinguished psychia-
trist, Viets, expressed in 1949, that "a new psychiatry may be said
to have been born in 1935 when Moniz took his first bold step in
psychosurgery"' 7 did not appear prophetic.
Thus, psychosurgery remained dormant until ten years ago, when
the hard-to-abandon procedure came to life like a phoenix arising
from its ashes. Occasionally, the psychiatrist whose patient re-
mained intractably disabled would recommend psychosurgery. A
few neurosurgeons continued the procedure in the treatment of the
suffering of cancer.
The limitations of pharmacotherapy became apparent whenever
drugs failed to eliminate certain specific symptoms. In addition,
comparison of the effect of two different psychotropic drugs offered
little hope for the acquisition of reliable information if the site or
mechanism of action of either was not available. After all, psycho-
surgery is the only biological treatment based on specific knowledge
of brain function. Comparisons of operative procedures could offer
the opportunity for acquiring valuable data concerning normal
brain function while serving the needs of the mentally ill. Experi-
16. Editorial, 151 MED. REc. 335 (1940).
17. 241 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1025-26 (1949).
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mental data, clinical observations, sophisticated surgical tech-
niques afforded new information, particularly concerning the old
limbic areas of the brain.
The perfection of a stereotaxic device for delivering one or more
electrodes to a predetermined target in the brain gave the neurophy-
siologist and neurosurgeon an instrument for reaching the limbic
system with minimum damage to intervening structures. This al-
lowed for the recording of electrical behavior, and stimulation of
selected structure to confirm physiological correlates. Precise de-
struction of the target was used to treat behavioral disturbances.
These techniques were also applied to patients suffering intolerable
pain, muscle rigidity and involuntary movements of parkinsonism.
Stereotaxic surgery opened the way for bilateral procedures as
well as offering a convenient technique to determine the offending
side by electroencephalographic observations via depth electrodes.
A significant target proved to be the tip of the temporal lobe, the
amygdala, which had become identified as a crucial part of the
expanded concept of the limbic system. Focal brain disorder involv-
ing the amygdala appeared to be associated with poor impulse con-
trol and aggressive behavior particularly in the epileptic patient.
This was not to say that temporal lobe epilepsy caused aggression,
but rather that involvement of the amygdala may reveal itself as a
form of epilepsy or aggression or both. It must be stated that most
epileptic patients are not violent, but lead normal and productive
lives, and have occasionally been persons of genius.
Bilateral stereotaxic amygdalotomy, when restricted to patients
with seizure disorders demonstrating episodic aggression, did not
arouse significant controversy among neurosurgeons, nor between
neurosurgeons and psychiatrists. Nor did the procedure arouse the
public, create moral or civil liberty issues, and judicial or political
concern. However, when amygdalotomy was applied to those in
whom violence was the presenting sign, the controversy engen-
dered reached the halls of Congress. All psychosurgery came under
attack, neurosurgical research projects lost funding and the privi-
lege of the entire field of human experimentation was questioned."
As one might anticipate from the brief history of psychosurgery
outlined above, the leader of the opposition to the procedure was
and is a psychiatrist, Dr. Peter Roger Breggin. Dr. Breggin's ap-
18. See Breggin, The Political Aims of Psychosurgery, 13 DuQ. L. REV. 841 (1975).
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proach is not that of a psychiatric colleague disagreeing with a
neurosurgeon, but rather that of a crusader with the imagination of
a novelist and the skill of a lobbyist. As such, he has been the most
potent force in politicizing psychosurgery.
I too wish to confess to the pretensions of a novelist. On April 15,
1947, I performed a bilateral frontal lobotomy on Millard Wright, a
recidivist burglar. This surgery formed the basis of a novelized doc-
umentary published twenty-one years later.'9 The case, concerned
with the first criminal subjected to psychosurgery, previously had
been discussed by E. Mayer." The circumstances surrounding the
operation have been succinctly described:
In 1945 Millard was arrested for ten house breakings and rob-
beries in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Six weeks after his arrest,
he refused to eat or converse, seemed confused and apparently
attempted suicide. He was therefore transferred to a hospital
for the criminally insane until he was placed on trial in 1947.
At that time both Wright's lawyers and the local district attor-
ney requested that the defendant be lobotomized in an attempt
to cure him of his criminal tendencies. The judge agreed, but
upon Wright's return to court two months after his lobotomy a
different judge was presiding. Both the surgeon and the defen-
dant were eager to have the opportunity to test the efficacy of
the procedure, but the new judge was not convinced that
Wright should be allowed to be free. However, because of
Wright's demonstrated desire to help medical science, he re-
ceived the comparatively light sentence of two to twelve years
of the possible forty years to life. Wright later committed sui-
cide while in prison.2'
I was in search of decisive judgments concerning the effects of
frontal lobotomy on a man who was also a criminal. I hoped to make
such a study significant for man, as well as to learn if the procedure
could alter repetitive antisocial behavior. It was an intensive study.
It was my good fortune to study a living man before and after plac-
ing lesions in his brain and to have the privilege of verifying the site
and extent of those lesions on post-mortem examination.
19. Y.D. KOSKOFF & R. GOLDHURST, THE DARK SIDE OF THE HOUSE (1968) [hereinafter
cited as KOSKOFF].
20. Mayer, Prefrontal Lobotomy and the Courts. 38 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 576 (1948).
21. Annas & Glantz, Psychosurgery: The Law's Response, 54 B.U.L. REV. 249, 250-51
(1974).
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It may be decisively stated that following the frontal lobotomy
Millard Wright remained a pain complaining person. It is sig-
nificant that in his instance lobotomy was performed before the
onset of an ulcer-cancer syndrome (of the stomach), thus fur-
nishing an unexpected opportunity to test the effect of frontal
lobotomy as a prophylaxis against the development of anxiety
associated with pain which so clearly constitutes suffering.
Tension and anxiety were unrelieved by the surgery. In about
one month the style of language characteristic of Millard
Wright before lobotomy had completely returned. And while it
is true for a time at least Wright experienced fewer dreams
following lobotomy, he did "daydream" and on occasion expe-
rienced sustained anger. It is obviously not true of the post-
lobotomized Millard Wright that he avoided adventure and
sought a more or less stereotyped routine of activities . . .
(Millard Wright's) pattern of operation as a burglar was essen-
tially unchanged."
His return to criminal behavior four years after the frontal lobo-
tomy, at a time when he apparently had achieved a satisfactory
status in society was disheartening. For Millard Wright, "authentic
living" required entering the dark side of the house.
Twenty-five years ago it was possible for a neurosurgeon in search
of decisive judgments to perform a psychosurgical procedure on a
criminal. Recognizing that much of his previous work involved the
pyramiding of unknowns he was grateful to the subject, who had
requested the surgery, and to the attorneys and the court for making
possible the intensive study of a man before and after the experi-
mental procedure. Now such study would be precluded by the
Kaimowitz decision and its legal restraint.
Why did the Kaimowitz case come to fruition at this time? Events
between 1947 and now have made society so vulnerable to human
scientific investigation that David Bazelon, Chief Justice of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, could say:
A cult may be growing up around the ethics of human experi-
mentation that may neither be good for patients nor the pro-
gress of medicine . . . Experimentation is becoming a "dirty"
word.23
22. KOSKOFF, supra note 19, at 216-17.
23. Bazelon, The Perils of Wizardry, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 1317, 1322 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Bazelon].
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First: The Nuremberg Military Tribunal exposed the crimes
against human beings performed by physicians during the holocaust
in the name of research. The Nuremberg Code is a judicial summary
presented in the case of the Nazi doctors accused of these war
crimes. The code, involving ten principles concerning human exper-
imentation, developed by the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, is not
considered legal precedent in America. Yet, so pervasive was the
travesty of human experimentation perpetrated by a perverse politi-
cal regime that it produced what I refer to as a traumatic neurosis,
a terror neurosis, the Nuremberg neurosis characterized by world
guilt. The Nuremberg Code, adopted in 1948,24 is reflected in nu-
merous statements of medical ethics." All ten principles of the Code
were embodied in the Kaimowitz opinion."
Second: The momentum of research has rapidly increased. Thirty
years ago three major classes of drugs were unknown: The antibiot-
ics, the antihistaminics, the psychoactive drugs. Despite extensive
animal trial, the human being remained the essential test site. Not
to have tested polio vaccine on children would have been unthinka-
ble.
Surgical research, particularly in organ transplants and heart
maladies, came to the fore in dramatic fashion. Again the human
being remained the essential test site. With advancing technology
there came an inevitable distancing of medical personnel from the
patient. The very sick were monitored. Vital signs were recorded. No
nurse or other human agent was required. Precision with its attend-
ant safety features supplanted the touch of human hands.
Third: With advancing technology and its dramatization by the
press, fear of control by brain manipulation became heightened. For
example, Arthur C. Clarke observed:
Electronic possession of human robots controlled from a central
broadcasting station is something that even George Orwell
24. TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 181-84 (U.S.
Gov't Printing Office 1949).
25. E.g., the American Medical Association's Ethical Guidelines for Clinical Investiga-
tion, Opinions and Reports of the Judicial Council 9-11 (1969); the American Psychological
Association's Ethical Standards of Psychologists, 18 AM. PSYCHOL. 56 (1963); and the World
Medical Association's Declaration of Helsinki, reprinted in 271 N. ENG. J. MED. 473 (1964).
26. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19,434 -AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne
Co., Mich., July 10, 1973).
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never thought of; but it may be technically possible long before
1984.7
And Karen Wagner titled a paper Psychocivilization or Electro-
ligarchy.5 Elliot Valenstein of the University of Michigan, in his
authoratative and critical examination of brain stimulation and
psychosurgery, notes:
Most people have a grossly exaggerated impression of the
omnipotence of various brain manipulations, a distorted view
of the way specific brain regions are related to behavior, and
an uncritical attitude toward suggestions of application of
brain technology to social problems. 9
In short, brain control has become a modern myth.
Fourth: The psychologist and his theories have come under scru-
tiny. There has been increasing concern, particularly in the Bureau
of Prisons, over the propriety of using behavior modification tech-
niques in the criminal justice system." The experimental and theo-
retical basis of these forms of behavior modification may be traced
to B. F. Skinner, who was in search of a behavior technology "to
make vast needed changes in human behavior."3' He argues against
philosophers who try to stay within the world of the mind; against
the psychotherapist who regards the disturbing things men do as
symptoms, superficial compared with the Freudian drama staged in
the depths of the mind. Rather, Skinner would use a technology of
behavior to change the world in which we live. Instead of emphasiz-
ing freedom and dignity as personal attributes, he directs our atten-
tion to the physical and social environments in which we live.
Behavioral programs involving the systematic manipulation of
behavior along the psychological principles evolved in the Skinner
system have been increasingly tested at both the state and federal
levels. But any form of manipulation raises the spectre of control.
Who will ultimately use such technology and to what end?
27. E. VALENSTEIN, BRAIN CONTROL 7 (1973), quoting A.C. CLARKE, PROFILES OF THE FUTURE
(1964) [hereinafter cited as VALENSTEIN].
28. Waggner, Psychocivilization or Electroligarchy: Dr. Delgado's Amazing World of
ESP, 33 YALE ALUMNI MAG. 20 (1970).
29. VALENSTEIN, supra note 27, at 7-8.
30. Oefsner, House Panel Schedules Hearing on Behavior Modification in Federal Prisons,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1974, at 16, col. 1.
31. B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 14 (1972).
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Fifth: Behavior control with drugs has been an expanding part of
medical care. Currently there is far reaching reliance on psycho-
tropic (mind controlling) drugs, particularly those in the phenothia-
zine family-Thorazine and Mellaril. These anti-psychotic drugs
have been the target of investigations of their use in hospitals for
the mentally ill and mentally retrarded. Reliance on drugs is almost
universal for the juvenile and adult inmates in the nations nearly
two hundred institutions. In a survey conducted in 1967 by Ronald
Shipman, 32 a psychologist at the National Institute of Mental
Health, 51 percent of the patients surveyed were receiving psycho-
tropic drugs regularly; 39 percent were receiving phenothiazines
(Thorazine, Mellaril). Duration of utilization of such drugs ranged
from four years to indefinite use. Obvious side effects included:
Parkinsonism, chemical hepatitis, tardive dyskinesia characterized
by uncontrollable movements of tongue, face, hands and feet. More
subtle, but perhaps in the long run more damaging because covert,
particularly in children, was reduced alertness and cognitive im-
pairment. Suppression of learning occurred at a time when the
growing child was most receptive to intellectual and emotional ma-
turation, and while certain adverse effects of medication are reversi-
ble, time lost for learning is not. This should be remembered when
evaluating the so-called irreversible effects of psychosurgery in chil-
dren.
The issue of drug abuse in institutions was recognized to involve
difficult medical and ethical judgments. The warning was loud and
clear that if the medical and allied professions would not, or could
not, handle the problems, the courts would.
Sixth: The concept that mental health is a civil rights issue has
had far reaching consequences. Civil rights history was said to have
been made in 1971 in Alabama in the case of Wyatt v. Stickney.33
According to the decision reached in this case, when persons are
committed for mental deficiencies they have "a constitutional right
to receive such individual treatment as will give them a realistic
opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental condition."34
32. Mosher, Daily Sedation Turns Many of the Mentally Ill Into Pawns in a Pill Game,
The National Observer, Jan. 11, 1975, at 1, col. 2, 3.
33. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974).
34. Id. at 784.
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Thus, the right to treatment doctrine was born. 5 In 1974, Welsch
v. Likins3 took Wyatt a step further. The court there held that
excessive use of tranquilizing medication as a means of controlling
behavior, not merely as a part of therapy, may likewise infringe on
plaintiff's rights.
The right to treatment doctrine poses, however, some delicate
practical problems. The responsibility of the state to those it has
confined may, of course, be discharged by the release of those being
confined. Dr. Allan Stone of the Harvard Law School, has expressed
this concern lest patients be released unfit for society: "What we are
really addressing is the enormous matter of social responsibility. It
is true that a state could comply by abdicating its responsibility to
help the mentally ill."37
It further seems that the issues involved are more complex than
indicated by the civil rights arguments. Legislators are not eager to
spend money for the mentally ill. HEW is the first to suffer the
consequences of budgetary cuts. The psychiatrist then becomes the
scapegoat. In Donaldson v. O'Connor,'3 the plaintiff was awarded
$38,500 in damages against two psychiatrists at the Tallahassee
Hospital. The psychiatrist, already difficult to attract to the profes-
sional staff of a public mental hospital, will now be aware that he
becomes exposed to liability in negligence for a legislature's inade-
quacies in supplying facilities and adequate staff. Psychiatrists will
practice defensively. They will join the ranks of their surgical col-
leagues in the present endemic of negligence suits, further aggravat-
ing the impending crisis in medical care.
Apart from all other concerns, including who is competent to
make decisions concerning the health of the patient, should the
patient after discharge prove to have suffered mental changes as the
35. The rationale behind the doctrine has been described thusly:
We held that where the jusification for commitment was treatment, it offended the
fundementals of due process if treatment were not in fact provided; and we held that
where the justification was the danger to self or others, then treatment had to be
provided as the quid quo pro society had to pay as the price of the extra safety it
derived from the denial of the individuals' liberty.
Wyatt v Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312 (5th Cir. 1974).
36. 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974).
37. Kidney, Mental Patient Rights Weighed, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1974, at 33, col. 2, 3
[hereinafter referred to as Kidney].
38. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Donaldson
was relied on heavily by the court in Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312 (1974). See text
accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
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result of as yet undiagnosed organic maladies, including brain
tumor, the doctor may be held liable in a negligence action. He is
caught between the pincers of the civil liberties lawyers and those
specializing in negligence actions.
The adversary position between Medicine and Law aggravated
the general attack against psychiatry itself by psychiatrists like Dr.
Thomas Szasz (Professor of Psychiatry, Upstate Medical Center)
who believes that there are no mental patients, and that the psy-
chiatric problem is purely a penal problem-all psychiatry is pen-
ology."0 Judge Bazelon, however, warns that promoting the idea that
there is no such thing as mental illness, only a sick society with a
distorted view of people, is destructive; in the long run, the patient
is the sufferer.40
Peter Sedgwick, political scientist-psychologist best expresses my
own view concerning the main flow of the antipsychiatry movement:
The revisionists have brought themselves and their public into
a state of complete inertia. They can expose the hypocrisies
and annotate the tragedies of official psychiatry, but the con-
cepts which they have developed enable them to engage in no
public action which is grander than that of wringing their
hands.4
Seventh: The concept of informed consent has been expanded and
has become a legal requirement. it is tort law that consent is the
mechanism by which the patient grants the physician power to act
in his behalf, and protects him from unauthorized invasion of his
person. Recently, the requirement of informed consent has become
an essential part of the transaction between patient and physician
with ever widening application. An operation upon a patient with-
out his informed consent is the tort of battery. This applies to re-
search. Benjamin Cardozo is often recalled to give emphasis to the
doctrine of informed consent: "Every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his body.''4
The requirement of informed consent in therapeutic and experi-
39. Kidney, supra note 37.
40. Bazelon, supra note 23, at 1317-22.
41. Sedgwick, Illness, Mental and Otherwise-Salunagurdi, reprinted in 1 HASTINGS CEN-
TER STUDIES 19, 39 (1973).
42. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hasps., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
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mental procedures has been received with ambivalence. For some,
who believe that patients and subjects are best protected by the
Hippocratic admonition that above all no harm should be done, the
doctrine seems unnecessary. Dr. Ingelfinger regards the process of
obtaining informed consent as an elaborate ritual: "The subject's
only real protection depends on the conscience and compassion of
physician, scientist and his peers."43 A Pennsylvania court, how-
ever, has noted:
As the patient must bear the expense, pain and suffering of any
medical treatment, his right to know all material facts pertain-
ing to the proposed treatment cannot be dependent upon the
self-imposed standards of the medical profession."
What constitutes being informed? The simple dictionary meaning
is having information. But in the context of interaction between two
people, the patient and the doctor, there are psychological, seman-
tic, and ethical complexities. The informant has no difficulty in
reciting hopes and hazards of the contemplated procedure, and the
courts recognize that it is not essential to give stressful information
to emotionally vulnerable people. But all patients are undergoing
varying degrees of stress. Denial mechanisms reject what the doctor
is saying. Recall is spotty. There is no adequate language to describe
sensory experience; one must feel it to have knowledge of it. The
transaction between doctor and patient is inherently unequal by
virtue of the doctor's knowledge and experience. Furthermore, there
is regression in illness; above all else the patient needs reassurance.
Of course, it is ethically wrong to deny the patient the human dign-
ity of communication with his doctor. But in the final decision the
patient will ask: "What do you think Doctor?" Not to relieve a sick
person of the necessity of decision is, in my view, cruel and unusual
punishment.
The issue of informed consent is crucial to the Kaimowitz case.
Kaimowitz widened the scope of its application, raised problems of
great complexity and added unrealizable requirements. A landmark
decision became in part a semantic swamp.
Because the Kaimowitz case was brought to public attention
through dramatization by the press, presentation of a few of the
news accounts would be appropriate at this juncture. Newspapers
43. Ingelfinger, Informed (But Uneducated) Consent, 287 NEw ENG. J. MED. 465 (1972).
44. Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 265, 286 A.2d 647, 650 (1971).
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are one of societies personal documents, reflecting the hopes and
concerns of people, while at the same time informing them. Civil
libertarians and those concerned with ethical problems have voiced
the view that it behooves the physician and scientist to take the
public into their confidence. The news report ensures that this be-
comes at least partly inevitable. Indeed, there may have been no
Kaimowitz case had it not been for the Detroit Free Press.
On March 12, 1973, The New York Times blazoned forth in front
page headlines: PSYCHOSURGERY WILL FACE A KEY TEST
IN COURT, and described the pending Kaimowitz hearing as a
"precedent-setting case thrusting John Doe into the center of a
mounting controversy over the use of brain surgery to erase the
symptoms of an otherwise untreatable behavioral and emotional
disorder." 5 The article was accompanied by a diagramatic repre-
sentation of the limbic system or emotional brain and an x-ray
picture of the skull with deep electrodes in situ. In addition to
drawing vivid attention to psychosurgery, critical questions in psy-
chiatry, law and medicine were raised:
[W]hatever the outcome of the case, the consequences of the
debate in psychosurgery will be felt by countless thousands of
people. Ordinary people with families and jobs as well as insti-
tutionalized patients and prisoners whose lives are made intol-
erable by behavioral or emotional problems that cannot be
treated by traditional psychotherapuetic methods. Research is
likely to be affected."
The concern over the effect on research was not without sub-
stance. Dr. Jacques Gottlieb, Director of the Lafayette Clinic cau-
tioned: "The adventure of research is becoming more difficult with
more and more stumbling blocks and it is frightening to the young
men who want to become investigators.""4 Dr. Henry K. Beecher,
Harvard anesthesiologist added:
The waters are muddy. I would be loathe to use individuals
labeled criminally insane but on the other hand, here are peo-
ple who are sick, intolerably sick. Where can they go? Are we
going to cut off every avenue of rehabilitation? Talk about civil
45. Brody, Psychosurgery Will Face Key Test In Court Today, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1973,
at 1, col. 6.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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liberties . . . it would seem the hope for relief is a rather impor-
tant one.4"
A New York Times Sunday editorial noted that a myriad of tough
questions were raised and the psychosurgeon found himself in the
middle of an international controversy:
The present controversy . . . has had the effect of halting
nearly all studies of the technique in this country raising a not
unfamiliar dilemma. Without further studies the potential of
psychosurgery for good or ill will never be known.49
One of the major questions raised in the suit was: When is the
psychosurgeon permitted to do the surgery? William K. Stevens,
reporting on the results of the hearing, stated: "Experimental psy-
chosurgery may not be performed on persons confined against their
will in state institutions even when such a person's consent is for-
mally obtained."5 0 The unanimous forty-one page opinion did, how-
ever, leave the way open for the performance of psychosurgery when
the procedure has advanced to a level where its benefits clearly
outweigh its risks. Gabe Kaimowitz, plaintiff's attorney stated:
The medical profession will have learned as a result of this to
shy away from any kind of experimentation on captive popula-
tions and high risk experimentation on voluntary populations.
This puts the doctors on notice that their work is subject to
scrutiny."
Years ago a more mature observation concerning doctors came from
the pen of Justice Cardozo: "We may scoff at [the physician] in
health but we send for him in pain."5
An extract from the text of the Kaimowitz opinion clarifies the
circumstances and issues involved:
This case came to this Court originally as a complaint for a writ
of Habeas Corpus brought by Plaintiff Kaimowitz on behalf of
John Doe and the Medical Committee for Human Rights, al-
48. Id.
49. Brody, Psychosurgery: Myriad Tough Questions, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1973, at 14,
col. 1.
50. Stevens, Psychosurgery Curbed by Courts, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1973, at 11, col. 1.
51. Thomas, Psychosurgery Ban Could Set Legal Precedent, The Miami Herald, July 15,
1973, at 5, col. 1.
52. B.N. CARDOZO, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 970 (1931) (text
of address before N.Y. Academy of Medicine, Nov. 1, 1928).
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leging that John Doe was being illegally detained in the Lafay-
ette Clinic for the purpose of experimental psychosurgery.
John Doe had been committed by the Kalamazoo County Cir-
cuit Court on January 11, 1955, to the Ionia State Hospital as
a Criminal Sexual Psychopath, without a trial of criminal
charges, under the terms of the then existing Criminal Sexual
Psychopathic Law. He had been charged with the murder and
subsequent rape of a student nurse at the Kalamazoo State
Hospital while he was confined there as a mental patient.
In 1972, Drs. Ernst Rodin and Jacques Gottlieb of the Lafay-
ette Clinic, a facility of the Michigan Department of Mental
Health had filed a proposal "For the Study of Treatment of
Uncontrollable Aggression."
This was funded by the Legislature of the State of Michigan
for the fiscal year, 1972. After more than seventeen years at the
Ionia State Hospital, John Doe was transferred to the Lafayette
Clinic in November of 1972, as a suitable research subject for
the clinic's study of uncontrollable aggression.
Under the terms of the study, twenty-four criminal sexual psy-
chopaths in the state's mental health system were to be sub-
jects of experiment. The experiment was to compare the effects
of surgery on the amygdaloid portion of the limbic system of
the brain with the effect of the drug cyproterone acetate on the
male hormone flow. The comparision was intended to show
which, if either, could be used in controlling aggression of
males in an institutional setting, and to afford permanent relief
from such aggression to the patient.
Substantial difficulties were encountered in locating a suitable
patient population for the surgical procedures and a matched
controlled group for the treatment by the anti-androgen drug.
As a matter of fact, it was concluded that John Doe was the
only known appropriate candidate available within the state
mental health system for the surgical experiment.
John Doe signed an "informed consent" form to become an
experimental subject prior to his transfer from the Ionia State
Hospital. He had obtained signatures from his parents giving
consent for the experimental and innovative surgical proce-
dures to be performed on his brain, and two separate three-man
review committees were established by Dr. Rodin to review the
scientific worthiness of the study and the validity of the con-
sent obtained from Doe.
The Scientific Review Committee, headed by Dr. Elliot Luby,
approved of the procedure, and the Human Rights Review
Committee, consisting of Ralph Slovenko, a Professor of Law
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and Psychiatry at Wayne State University, Monsignor Clifford
Sawher, and Frank Moran, a certified public accountant, gave
their approval to the procedure.53
Certainly, it would appear that the procedure was careful, and the
review committees were appropriate. Only one suitable candidate
for the psychosurgery was found. One may reasonably express some
concern about the choice since subsequently John Doe was regarded
as capable of living in the outside world after his long incarceration.
Apparently, the discharge, ordered by the court in consultation with
a single psychiatrist, was a calculated risk, perhaps motivated by
the previously determined violation of his constitutional rights. 4
The law, as well as medicine, must take risks affecting both the
individual and society.
Even though no experimental subjects were found to be available
in the state mental health system other than John Doe, Dr. Rodin
prepared to proceed with the experiment on Doe, and depth elec-
trodes were to be inserted into his brain on or about January 15,
1973. In response to the avalanche of publicity initiated by the
Detroit Free Press, Dr. Yudaskin withdrew his approval of the pro-
ject. Subsequently, Mr. Doe decided not to consent to the proce-
dure. In other words, there were no stated plans to carry out the
research nor a subject suitable for it.
Nevertheless, it was held by the court that even though the expe-
riment would not take place, the matter was not moot and the basic
issues involved were ripe for declaratory judgment. Why? Although
it is not altogether clear, the court states:
The nature of the case is such that we are likely to again receive
the question in the near future, and doctors and other people
dealing with public hospital corporations cannot hope to have
an answer to the questions raised unless we proceed to deci-
sion .
In surgery, when we are uncertain as to whether to proceed, we
hold action in abeyance. We remember the Hippocratic admonition
53. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19,434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne
Co., Mich., July 10, 1973) slip op. 1-5.
54. Id. at 1 n.2.
55. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19,434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne
Co., Mich., July 10, 1973) slip op. 7.
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-Do not harm. The ill-timed court action did harm. It amplified
existing problems arising from the doctrine of informed consent;
it impeded needed investigation in the field under consideration,
in research in humans by humans for humans and the potential for
relief of suffering in countless patients.
The two issues framed for decision in this declaratory judgment
action were as follows:
After failure of established therapies, may an adult or a le-
gally appointed guardian, if the adult is involuntarily detained,
at a facility within the jurisdiction of the State Department of
Mental Health give legally adequate consent to an innovative
or experimental surgical procedure on the brain, if there is
demonstrable physical abnormality of the brain, and the proce-
dure is designed to ameliorate behavior, which is either person-
ally tormenting to the patient, or so profoundly disruptive that
the patient cannot safely live, or live with others?
If the answer to the above is yes, then is it legal in this State
to undertake an innovative or experimental surgical procedure
on the brain of an adult who is involuntarily detained at a
facility within the jurisdiction of the State Department of Men-
tal Health, if there is demonstrable physical abnormality of the
brain, and the procedure is designed to ameliorate behavior,
which is either personally tormenting to the patient, or so pro-
foundly disruptive that the patient cannot safely live, or live
with others?"6
The second issue was rendered moot since the answer to the first
question was "no." The court, in a most arbitrary way, stated:
"Psychosurgery should never be undertaken upon involuntarily
committed populations when there is a high risk, low benefit ratio
as determined in this case."57 This determination could not have
been made on the basis of facts in the case of John Doe. John Doe
was apparently well enough to be discharged. Without irreverance
to the court, I find a kind of logic of the absurd in talking of "this
case" as if hard evidence had been presented. The court talks pro-
perly of declaratory judgments depending on a choice of conflicting
views of experts in the fields of neurology, psychiatry and electroen-
cephalography. In other words, the court was in the untenable posi-
tion of making a medical decision in a complex area, not a legal
56. Id. at 8-9.
57. Id. at 13.
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decision. It naively asks if brain function is related to abnormal
aggressive behavior, and adds in a non sequitur: "This fundamen-
tally is what the case is all about.""8 Such a proposition leads to
blind alleys and confusion. All behavior-normal, pathological,
aggressive, nonaggressive-remains a function of the brain. This
has been known at least since Hippocrates.
The court observed that psychosurgery does not provide any as-
surance that a dangerously violent person can be restored to the
community. What it failed to recognize was that medicine makes
no assurances. If guarantees were possible, experimentation would
be unnecessary. To claim there is no scientific basis for establishing
that the removal or destruction of an area of the limbic brain would
have any direct therapuetic effect in controlling aggressiveness or
improving tormenting personal behavior, absent the showing of a
well defined clinical syndrome, is an oversimplification.
Not infrequently, the physician and surgeon is required to treat
disabling symptoms in the absence of well-defined clinical entities.
But even epilepsy, regarded in this case as a well-defined clinical
syndrome, is in fact a variety of disturbances referred to generically
as the epilepsies, the symptoms of which may vary widely from
overt convulsions to obscure behavioral disturbances. Research has
been carried out in behavioral disorders with and without overt
convulsive disturbances directed toward the limbic system. V. Bal-
asubramaniam and his co-workers believe "there are many be-
havior disorders which are amenable only to stereotaxic interrup-
tion of various parts of the limbic system."59 Heimburger performed
stereotaxic destruction of the amygdala in twenty-five severely epi-
leptic and/or dangerously aggressive patients. Overall improvement
included reduction in hyperactivity, hostility, destructiveness and
hypersexuality.10 It must be stated that, in my view, it is unlikely
that aggression, a form of instinctual drive utilized in the service of
sex, exploration of the environments as well as hate and violence,
is localized in a specific "center" of the limbic system. What we
wish to learn is whether or not stereotaxic surgery directed toward
the amygdala, a part of the limbic system, may be useful in relieving
58. Id. at 14.
59. Balasubramaniam, Ramanujam, Kanaka & Ramamurthi, Stereotaxic Surgery for
Behavior Disorders, in PSYCHOSURGERY 156 (E. Hitchcock, L. Laitimer & K. Vaernet eds.
1972).
60. Heimburger, Witlock, Courtney & Kalsheck, Stereotaxic Amygdalotomy for Epilepsy
with Aggressive Behavior, 198 J.A.M.A. 741 (1966).
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those tormented patients who are destructive to themselves and the
world about them. That is what the case is all about.
The basic reason why psychosurgery should never be undertaken
upon an involuntarily committed population, the court says, is the
impossibility of obtaining truly informed consent from such popula-
tions. Medicine deals for the most part, not with impossibility, but
with probability. We regard the impossible as inadmissible.
It is contended that before the Kaimowitz court fashioned its
demanding standards of informed consent for the proposed experi-
mental amygdalotomy on John Doe, the procedural safeguards
enunciated by the Wyatt "right to treatment" opinion were not
being adhered to. Paramount would have been the insistence on the
right for John Doe to secure independent counsel. The idea of that
right did not become apparent until after the Michigan Legal Serv-
ices challenged the proposal.
The procedural safeguards utilized in the case of Millard Wright
could have served as a model. The neurosurgeon was consulted by
a subject concerning the possible use of psychosurgery in the pres-
ence of the subject's attorney. Following the detailed discussion
with Millard Wright concerning the hope and hazards of the con-
templated procedure, Wright gave his consent in the presence of his
attorney. The presiding judge was consulted, and a court order was
issued to the effect that the surgery be performed.
Nevertheless the Kaimowitz court chose to grapple with the heav-
ily burdened issue of informed consent, designing more exacting
standards with a strong reliance on the Nuremberg Code. According
to the court, for the involuntarily committed mental patient to meet
the requirements of voluntary consent, he must be competent and
knowledgeable. The Kaimowitz court affirms the principle that an
institutionalized patient may be competent to give consent for a
''regular surgical procedure" but that an involuntarily detained
mental patient is not competent to give consent for experimental
psychosurgery.6 '
The court's reasoning appears inconsistent. The court described
the deleterious effects of prolonged institutionalization on the ca-
pacity of the person to give informed consent, noting: "The very
nature of his incarceration diminishes the capacity to consent to
61. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19,434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne
Co., Mich., July 10, 1973) slip op. at 21.
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psychosurgery. He is particularly vulnerable as a result of his men-
tal condition, the deprivation stemming from involuntary confine-
ment, and the effects of the phenomenon of institutionalization.""
But should amygdalotomy cease to be considered experimental,
then the involuntarily detained patient could give consent to the
performance of the procedure. In other words, the decision rests on
whether or not the procedure is experimental rather than on the
capacity to give informed consent. According to the court:
Although guardian or parental consent may be legally ade-
quate when arising out of traditional circumstances, it is le-
gally ineffective in the psychosurgery situation. The guardian
or parent cannot do that which the patient absent a guardian
would be legally unable to do. 3
Again, a possible absurdity. Though the opinion notes that at some
future time an involuntarily detained mental patient could consent
to demonstrably therapeutic amygdalotomy, this suggestion is
meaningless for the reasons stated above.
If it were supposed that competency is a trait which can never be
established in any member of the entire institutionalized mental
population, case by case evaluation becomes inevitable. What is
served by discriminating against a class? Can one say with a degree
of medical probability that involuntary commitment establishes the
determination of lack of competency? According to the Kaimowitz
court voluntary consent is impossible because of the inherent ine-
quality between doctors and administrators and the patient:
Involuntarily confined mental patients live in an inherently
coercive institutional environment. Indirect and subtle psy-
chological coercion has profound effect upon the patient popu-
lation. Involuntarily confined patients cannot reason as equals
with the doctors and administrators on whether they should
undergo psychosurgery. They are not able to voluntarily give
informed consent because of the inherent inequality in their
position."
As previously described, the inherent inequality, particularly be-
tween doctor and patient, is universal.
62. Id. at'25.
63. Id. at 26.
64. Id. at 29.
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The paradox is this: The court is aware of psychosurgery's thera-
peutic potential and is aware that experimental research is essential
for establishing the therapeutic value of amygdalotomy. But the
court believes that lack of knowledge about the subject of experi-
mental brain surgery, "makes a knowledgeable consent to psycho-
surgery literally impossible for the present time." 5 Therefore,
knowledgeable consent to experimental psychosurgery is impossi-
ble. There are no individuals available for psychosurgery and there
can never be under the circumstances proposed. Ironically, as no-
where else the proper study of Man is Man. It is almost impossible
by nonintrusive studies alone to determine whether amygdalotom-
ies on human beings can ever be therapeutic. Yet, despite the fact
that other avenues of research theoretically remain open (cingulo-
tomy, orbital undercutting, even electrical stimulation of the brain
E.S.B.) all forms of psychosurgery have been held in abeyance.
Psychosurgery of any kind will be illegal if courts follow Kaimowitz.
The court's concern about the violation of civil rights of patients
subjected the experimental brain surgery is unique and provocative.
The court based its reasoning on a hypothetical assumption that
valid consent could be given to the procedure "someday" at some
unspecified time. The Kaimowitz court, apparently sensitive to pos-
sible threats to civil liberties, considered its constitutional analysis
to be dicta. The warning of the late Justice Frankfurter comes to
mind: "in constitutional adjudications dicta are peculiarly perni-
cious usurpers. To let even accumulated dicta govern is to give the
future no hearing."6
Kaimowitz dicta indicate that the judiciary must guard against
violation of constitutional rights; and that there are constitutional
limits in the emerging right to treatment doctrine. A constitutional
right to be free from experimental psychosurgical operations is one
such limit. However, judicial intervention in the area of medical
research might produce the untoward result of obstructing the basic
"right to treatment."
In citing the first amendment, the judges observed "that the gov-
ernment has no power or right to control men's minds, thoughts and
expressions." 7 If the first amendment protects the freedom to ex-
65. Id. at 27.
66. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, 45 HARV. L. REV. 33, 85
(1931).
67. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19,434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne
Co., Mich., July 10, 1973) slip op. at 35.
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press ideas, it necessarily follows that it must protect the freedom
to generate ideas. It is argued:
Psychosurgery often limits the ability to generate new
ideas. . . . Its potential for injury to the "creativity" of the
individual is great, and can impinge upon the right of an indi-
vidual to be free from interference with his mental prowesses.8
Such statements fail to take into account the fact that patients
often are capable of generating new ideas after psychosurgery. These
ideas may be adaptive and lead to a more useful, less tormented life.
Anatomical loss may be associated with functional gain. Sometimes
the capacity to generate new ideas is essentially unchanged as in the
case of Millard Wright.
A further question raised by the above quotation is what is meant
by "creativity"? Creativity, as most conceive the term, indicates a
capacity of gifted people to conceive a work of art, or scientific
enterprise, or an imaginative way to make people live more happily
together. To my knowledge such data before and after psychosur-
gery are not available. Millard Wright was a more "creative crook"
after frontal lobotomy than before. He could formulate and execute
a plan with skill and style.
In any case, the first amendment protects the right to generate
and disseminate ideas which the individual himself has the freedom
to express. If a person has a valid reason for wanting psychosurgery,
there can be no constitutional need to prevent him from doing so.
Logically the government can no more interfere with an indi-
vidual's choice to undergo brain surgery than it can to coerce
free speech under the guise of protecting society's first amend-
ment interest."
What if a committed person insists on having a psychosurgical
procedure performed? Are his constitutional rights infringed upon
if he is denied the procedure? An appropriate case needs to be
brought before a federal court. When tested at a higher court I
believe the Kaimowitz restraint will prove to be "short term."
The constitutional concept of the right of privacy is brought to
bear in the Kaimowitz case. The arguments are eloquent:
68. Id. at 36.
69. Mason, supra note 4, at 329.
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Nor are the intimate internal areas of the physical habitation
of mind and soul any less deserving of preservation from un-
warranted and forcible intrusion than are the intimate internal
areas of the physical habitation of wife and family. Is not the
sanctity of the body even more important, and therefore, more
to be honored in its protection that the sanctity of the home.7"
The garden of the mind, however, may not always be a private
Eden. It can be a hell of suffering, a generator of violence theatening
the self and the world about it. Yet, says the Kaimowitz courts:
"There is no privacy more deserving of constitutional protection
than one's mind." 7'
Intrusion into one's intellect is an intrusion into one's constitu-
tional right of privacy. But the world of the mind is always private.
Sherrington, in a philosophical mood, believed brains were invented
so minds could communicate with each other. The Kaimowitz ex-
pansion of the concept of right of privacy enters the domain of the
metaphysical. The founding fathers probably would have under-
stood these excursions into the realm of metaphysics but the "true
purpose of the Bill of Rights is to establish limits on governmental
power, not to foreclose individual choice. The rights of free speech
and privacy should not preclude a mental patient from having an
operation to which he has voluntarily consented."7
The present epidemic of negligence suits which has brought medi-
cal care to a crisis has spread to the area of psychosurgery.73 Psycho-
surgical procedures for established therapeutic, as well as experi-
mental, reasons are being brought to an abrupt halt. The patient
suffering the intractable pain of cancer is deprived of the option
psychosurgery may offer. Experimental and therapeutic techniques,
often interrelated, involving such procedures as cryosurgery for
Parkinsonism, implanted stimulating devices to abort convulsive
attacks, and similar techniques involving the use of implanted elec-
trodes have come under the threat of negligence actions. Risk char-
acteristic of the frontier of the acquisition of knowledge in the serv-
70. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19,434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne
Co., Mich., July 10, 1973) slip op. at 39.
71. Id. at 38.
72. Mason, supra note 4, at 330.
73. On December 3, 1973, five months after the Kaimowitz decision was rendered, a suit
for negligence was filed by a patient on whom psychosurgery had been performed to alleviate
violent rage. Killie v. Mark, Civil No. 681,998 (Super. Ct. Suffolk Co., Mass., filed Dec. 3,
1973).
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ice of the patient will not be taken. This inhibiting effect on human
experimentation is contrary to the long term public good.
The Kaimowitz extension of the doctrine of informed consent
poses insuperable problems for institutionalized persons, other than
mental patients. I refer particularly to prisoners. If one agrees that,
"the infantalizing depersonalizing, helplessness and anonymity that
occur within a prison environment force the prisoner into a state of
total dependency,"" informed consent, according to the Kaimowitz
criteria, becomes unobtainable. Such blurring of individual differ-
ences in the way persons respond to adverse circumstances obsures
the true facts of contemporary psychology. Each person, depending
on his constitutional psychological makeup, the time in his life
situation, and a host of other factors, will react in varying degrees
to incarceration or any other stress. To consider prisoners as a group
and deprive each in the group of a choice of options, regardless of
what subtle or overt motivations may uniquely affect his decision,
is to deprive each prisoner of his rights. The human and civil rights
of the prisoner are best protected on an individual basis."5
Neuroscientists, including neurosurgeons are in retreat. Neuros-
cientists, while recommending that psychosurgery be available to
individuals suffering from certain recognized incapacitating mental
disorders, say that such procedures should not be performed on
prisoners. 6 Dr. Vernon Mark believes that
under present conditions it would seem that the performance
of psychosurgery should be prohibited. . . and further, prison
inmates suffering from epilepsy should receive only medical
treatment; surgical therapy should not be carried out, because
of the difficulty in obtaining truly informed consent."
Hazards of negligence and battery suits, even criminal action,
aggravated by the tripartite elaboration of the doctrine of informed
consent in the Kaimowitz opinion, have become ominous possibili-
ties. Anxieties in surgeons are heightened by the published views of
Alvin J. Bronstein of the American Civil Liberties Union who argues
74. Bach-y-Rita, Commentary, 229 J.A.M.A. 45, 46 (1974).
75. The above considerations apply to behavior modification by drug and operant condi-
tioning techniques as well as psychosurgery.
76. See, d.g., statement of Theodore Bullock, President, Society for Neuroscientists, 32
ARCH. NEUROL. 73-75 (1975).
77. Altman, Ethics of Human Experimentation Debated at Science Forum, 225 J.A.M.A.
913, 920 (1973).
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that experiments on prisoners should be banned."8 However, Profes-
sor Freund of the Harvard Law School believes:
[T]here seems to be no good reason for depriving this group
of the satisfactions of participation on an informed basis, satis-
factions to them are often great indeed, bolstering their self
esteem and furnishing links to the general community and its
values."
The argument that the prisoner is a "captive" in a unique sense
is in itself untenable. Is not the guilt-laden noncaptive volunteer
imprisoned by his neurotic masochistic needs? Professor Louis
Lasagna asks:
Does it really protect the rights of a prisoner to forbid him
to volunteer for dangerous but potentially important experi-
ments in anticipation of some reward? Is such volunteering
generally different from the case of the test pilot who risks his
life in return for money, excitement or both?"0
Has the zealous concern with health as a legitimate function of
civil liberties been productive, however humanitarian in outlook? It
is fair to say that in certain instances the clamor resulting from civil
liberty actions has dramatized the poor quality of care, particularly
in mental hospitals. Doctors have known this for a long time. But
in the main doctors have been powerless to effect changes in facili-
ties and medical staff primarily because the goal of improved men-
tal health has only lately come to the fore, and only in certain areas.
To institute suits against psychiatrists is to misjudge the responsi-
ble target and to underestimate the extent of the problem. Basi-
cally, it is a question of economics in a society more concerned with
profits than patients.
Experimentation with human subjects is a generally acknowl-
edged necessity of modern scientific research. This is particularly
true in the area of medical investigation. There is an experimental
component in all medical diagnosis and treatment. Indeed, "[w]e
have to live with ambiguity, the treacherous impurity of everything
78. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1975, at 30, at col. 5.
79. Freund, Ethical Aspects of Experimentation with Human Subjects, 98 DAEDALUS viii,
xii (Spring 1969).
80. Lasagna, Special Subjects in Human Experimentation, 98 DAEDALUS 449, 455 (Spring
1969).
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human."'" There are no certainties. There are always risks. Medi-
cine is becoming increasingly experimental and so are the risks. The
modern teaching hospital which admittedly delivers the best health
care is the embodiment of research and treatment. The teaching
hospital develops our medical teachers, researchers, and therapists
vital to the best quality of medical care.
Kaimowitz aggravated the assault on the already vulnerable con-
cept of human experimentation as essential to innovative therapy
and scientific progress. Teachers and students will become more
and more disenchanted with the adventure of the acquisition of new
knowledge in the service of their patients. Lawyers with the most
lofty intentions who wish to protect patients' civil liberties must
remember that often "Hell is paved with good intentions," 2 and
those they most desire to help will be those who will be hurt the
most.
To deny the abuses in human experimentation is unwarranted,
but to obstruct human experimentation itself is foolhardy. We do
need additional safeguards beyond those now prevalent in experi-
mental brain surgery. National professional guidelines and proce-
dures need to be formulated to assure: that the individual suffers
from an incapacitating mental disorder; that psychosurgery is an
appropriate technique; and that informed consent, despite all its
ritualistic, symbolic qualities and its limitations, be obtained.
The psychosurgeon must study the individual patient before and
after each procedure, assiduously, carefully and in collaboration
with other specialists in the general field of human behavior. Noth-
ing supplants the intensive study of the single case. Careful, long
term follow-up and detailed reporting of results should be required.
It appears desirable that psychosurgery be performed in special in-
stitutions prepared to learn the most from every experience for the
understanding and guiding of future decisions.
Declaratory judgments, judicial opinions and statutes will not at
the present time be productive because such controls obstruct
human experimentation essential to progress in medical care. Elliot
Valenstein believes:
The struggle for the proper balance between the welfare of the
81. Jonas, Philosphical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, 98 DAEDALUS
219, 247 (Spring 1969).
82. I.J. BOSWELL, Li OF S.R. JOHNSON 555 (Everyman ed. 1775).
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individual and that of society will always be with us and cannot
be permanently resolved by decrees that prohibit experimenta-
tion in one situation or another. 3
I believe the conscience, intergrity and the skills of the experimen-
ter remain the best safeguards of human rights.
83. VALENSTEIN, supra note 27, at 346.
